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11. Burden of proof for future dangerousness
In his assignments of error, Royal asserted that during the penalty
phase, the court erroneously shifted the burden of persuasion to him to
"disprove that he was a future danger."11 The prosecution had put on Dr.
Ryans who testified that he was unable to state with medical certainty that
Royal would not repeat "violent behavior that put others at risk." 12 Royal
moved to strike this evidence on the ground that it was "equivocal."
13
The trial judge, who was also acting as sentencer, denied the motion and
commented to this effect: had Dr. Ryans stated there was a reasonable
degree of certainty that Royal would not repeat the behavior, "I would
have listened to [him].
'14
Royal argued that the judge's statement implied that the defendant
had the burden to disprove whatever evidence the Commonwealth put on
as to future dangerousness. 15 The Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed
Royal's argument, stating that, taken in context, the judge's comment did
not function to require affirmative expert testimony that Royal did not
constitute a continuous threat to society. Instead, it went to the weight
that the sentencer could give to Dr. Ryans' testimony. 16 As the Supreme
Court of Virginia saw it, the trial court's comment concerned only the
significance of the Commonwealth's evidence and was not intended to
say to the defendant, "If the prosecution has 'evidenced' future danger-
ousness, you must disprove it.' ' 17 Nonetheless, while rejecting the
defendant's argument, the Virginia Supreme Court also reaffirmed that
the burden of persuasion as to future dangerousness remains upon the
Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
11Royal, 250 Va. at 117-18,458 S.E.2d at 579.







Royal also assigned as error the trial judge's refusal to recuse
himself. He contended that there was substantial publicity surrounding
the case and that there was significant public pressure on the judge to
impose the death penalty.18 In rejecting this argument, the Supreme
Court of Virginia stated: "The record is devoid of any indication that the
trial court's sentencing decision was affected by public pressure or
publicity." 19 The court also declared that public notoriety alone is not
enough to vacate a death sentence.20 The court's opinion is a reminder
that counsel must be careful to create a record which evidences that the
court's decision was affected by community pressures. Such a record
should include comments made by the prosecution and the judge that
appear to reflect public opinion, as well as any other evidence available
to document the community atmosphere surrounding the trial.
IV. Vileness Removed
Finally, counsel should note that although Royal fired two shots into
Wallace, the trial judge granted Royal's motion at the penalty phase to
strike the Commonwealth's evidence relating to vileness as a statutory
predicate.2 1 The success of Royal's motion stresses the need to make
such motions in attacking the sufficiency of the Commonwealth's
evidence and makes clear that multiple shots by themselves do not
constitute vileness.
Summary and analysis by:
Mary E. Eade
18 1d.
19 Id. at 119, 458 S.E.2d at 579-80.
20 Id. at 119, 458 S.E.2d at 579, (citing Beaver v. Commonwealth,
232 Va. 521, 536, 352 S.E.2d 342, 350, cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1033
(1987)).
21 Id. at 114,458 S.E.2d at 577.
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FACTS
Ronald Lee Fitzgerald was convicted of robbery and capital murder
of Coy M. White and rape and capital murder of Claudia Denise White. 1
During the sentencing phase, Fitzgerald requested a jury instruction
based on Simmons v. South Carolina.2 The proposed instruction would
have informed the jury that under Virginia law, a person found guilty of
three separate felony offenses of murder, rape, or robbery by presenting
a firearm or other deadly weapon, or any combination of those offenses
which were not part of a common act, transaction, or scheme, is not
eligible for parole.3 The trial judge denied this instruction.4
I Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 299,301,455 S.E.2d 506,
507 (1995).
2 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994).
3 Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151(B11) (1994).
4 Fitzgerald, 249 Va. at 305, 455 S.E.2d at 510.
In the first stage of a bifurcated trial, the jury convicted Fitzgerald
of all the charged crimes.5 In the penalty stage, the jury fixed Fitzgerald's
sentence at death for the first count of capital murder based on the future
dangerousness predicate, and death for the second count of capital
murder based on the vileness and/or future dangerousness predicates. 6
HOLDING
Under Virginia Code sections 17.110.1(A) and 17-110.1(F), the
Supreme Court of Virginia consolidated the automatic review of
Fitzgerald's death sentence with his other appeals.7 The court then
upheld the convictions and death sentence.
8
5 Id. at 301,455 S.E.2d at 507.
61d. at 301,455 S.E.2d at 508.
7 Id. at 301-02, 455 S.E.2d at 508.
8 1d. at 310, 455 S.E.2d at 512.
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ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Simmons Jury Instruction
Simmons v. South Carolina held that when a defendant would be
ineligible for parole were he sentenced to life imprisonment rather than
death, the jury is entitled to that information. 9 In this case, Fitzgerald
wanted the jury to be given the opportunity to determine whether he
would be ineligible for parole pursuant to Virginia Code section 53.1-
151(B1). 10 This would require a jury determination of whether the
crimes for which he had just been convicted constituted a common act,
transaction, or scheme. The trialjudge denied Fitzgerald's proposedjury
instruction. The Commonwealth on appeal argued that Fitzgerald was
indeed eligible for parole since his convictions were part of a common
act, transaction, or scheme.11
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that parole eligibility was a
matter of law and not a question of fact for the jury. Even though the trial
courthad simply denied the proposed instruction and had not decided the
issue, the Supreme Court of Virginia determined that Fitzgerald would
have been parole eligible since his offenses were part of a common
scheme related to his girlfriend, Amanda White. 12 This determination by
the courtis probably binding as amatterof state law. However, Fitzgerald
may have preserved for federal review the question of whether he was
nonetheless entitled to a Simmons instruction. He argued on appeal that
the rationale of Simmons required that the jury be informed of "foresee-
able parole eligibility" by some appropriate means.
13
Since Fitzgerald's trial, Virginia has abolished parole, effective
January 1, 1995. However, even in cases which are governed by the
previous parole laws, capital defendants are arguably entitled to the
instruction. The fact that the defendant will be ineligible for twenty-five
or thirty years may be seen by the jury as sufficient to save the defendant
from a death sentence, so the parole information is mitigation. Further,
the increased reliability demanded in capital cases in determining that
future dangerousness exists may require the instruction. 14 Attorneys
who may still be defending cases that arose prior to January 1, 1995 are
urged to contact the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse for further
development of these arguments.
H. Juror Misconduct Claim
During voir dire, the court asked potential juror, James Bradshaw,
whether he or any member of his family had "been the victim of a rape,
robbery, or abduction," to which Bradshaw responded in the negative.
15
The opinion does not reflect whether at that time the attorney for the
defendant requested any further questioning of Bradshaw on this or
9 114 S. Ct. 2187, 2193.
10Fitzgerald, 249 Va. at 305, 455 S.E.2d at 510. Va. Code Ann. §
53.1-151(B1) states:
Any person convicted of three separate felony offenses of (i)
murder, (ii) rape or (iii) robbery by the presenting of firearms
or other deadly weapon, or any combination of the offenses
specified in subdivisions (i), (ii) or (iii) when such offenses
were not part of a common act, transaction or scheme shall not
be eligible for parole.
11 Id.
121d. at 306,455 S.E.2d at 510. (Fitzgerald wrote a letter to Amanda
White stating, "You just don't know how many people I was going to kill
over you girl. I tried to keep them off you but I couldn't.")
13 Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, Record Nos. 941426, 941586,
Brief for Appellant at 12-19.
14 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,305 (1976), and
Simmons 114 S.Ct. at 2198 (Souter, J. concurring) (discussing increased
reliability requirement).
15 Fitzgerald, 249 Va. at 307, 455 S.E.2d at 511.
related subjects. Bradshaw was eventually impaneled. At a post-trial
hearing, another juror reported that during the sentencing deliberations,
Bradshaw had stated that"hehad no sympathy for a rapistbecause either
his daughter or granddaughter was molested or raped when she was 13
years old." 16 Bradshaw also testified at the post-trial hearing. Upon
being questioned by counsel and the court, he stated that his granddaugh-
ter had indeed been molested, but that this fact had no bearing on his
determination of guilt or innocence of this defendant, or on wfiat
punishment he should receive. Fitzgerald moved for a new trial based on
Bradshaw's failure to disclose this information. The trial court denied the
motion.17
The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the trial court's ruling.
During voir dire, the court had asked only if Bradshaw or any member
of his family had been a victim of rape, robbery, or abduction. No one
questioned Bradshaw as to whether he or a family member had been the
victim of molestation. The court stated that since Bradshaw's grand-
daughter was molested, not raped, he had answered truthfully all ques-
tions asked of him.t 8
The Supreme Court of Virginia's ruling in this matter stresses how
important it is that attorneys insist on taking an active role during voir
dire. Attorneys are entitled to question potential jurors. The Code states,
"The court and counsel for either party shall have the right to examine
under oath any person who is called as ajuror therein and shall have the
right to ask such person orjuror directly any relevant question." 19 Rule
3A: 14 of the rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia reinforces the idea
that attorneys must be allowed to question jurors. The rule lists seven
questions which the court should ask. The rule then states that, after the
court has asked those questions, "the court, and counsel as of right, may
examine on oath any prospective juror and ask any question relevant to
his qualifications as an impartial juror."20 Thus, there is clear legislative
intent that the attorneys take an active role in voir dire. Of course, the trial
court is likely to use its discretion in order to limit the scope of relevant
questions. Nevertheless, it is important that defense attorneys insist on
taking an active role in this process, and that the attorney object on state
and federal grounds if the right to ask questions is denied or unduly
curtailed.
21
Finally, although the juror misconduct claim and possibly the
Simmons claim were preserved for federal review, it is disturbing that
only two claims were advanced on appeal. Every capital trial in Virginia
raises numerous constitutional questions. They should be raised, even in
the face of clearly adverse Virginia precedent. Simmons itself is a
testament to that.22
Summary and analysis by:
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16Id. at 307-08, 455 S.E.2d at 511.
17 Id. at 307-09, 455 S.E.2d 511-12.
18Id. Note, however, that Fitzgerald argued that Bradshaw's failure
to disclose the information about his granddaughter denied him the right
to an impartial jury (a federal claim based on the Sixth Amendment), not
merely that Bradshaw had been untruthful in his answers. Id.
19 Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-358 (1992) (emphasis added).
20 Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A:14 (emphasis added).
21 It is also important to remember to federalize the issue, claiming
a violation of Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury and the
arbitrary application of a state created right, in order to preserve mean-
ingful review. For a discussion of how to achieve this, see Konrad,
Federal Due Process and Virginia's Arbitrary Abrogation of Capital
Defendant's State-Created Rights, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No.
2, p. 16 (1991).
22 See Pohl and Turner, Ifat First You Don't Succeed: The Real and
Potential Impact of Simmons v. South Carolina in Virginia, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 28 (1994).
